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technology	 with	 pre-electronic	 principles	 of	 law.”1	 Judge	 Sweet’s	
proposition—that	Congress	and	the	judiciary	must	attempt	to	harmo-
nize	 new	 technologies	 with	 deep-seated	 legal	 doctrines2—is	 axio-
matic.	Indeed,	more	than	a	century	before	Judge	Sweet	wrote	his	dis-
sent	in	Matthew	Bender	&	Co.	v.	West	Publishing	Co.,	the	Supreme	Court	









































Photography	 would	 not	 be	 the	 last	 technology	 the	 judiciary	
would	 confront	 in	 the	 copyright	 context.	 Innumerable	 technologies	
have	emerged	since	the	Supreme	Court	decided	Burrow-Giles	in	1884.	
Courts	and	Congress	have	had	to	consider	whether,	inter	alia,	motion	
pictures,15	 mass-produced	 utilitarian	 articles,16	 and	 computer	 pro-
grams17	are	eligible	for	copyright	protection.	They	will	undoubtedly	

























ogies	 constitute	 original	 expressions	 that	 are	 fixed	 to	 a	 copy,	 such	
works	are	eligible	for	copyright	protection.19		
But	one	additional,	implicit	requirement	for	statutory	copyright	
eligibility	may	 yet	 exist:	 the	 original	 expression	must	 be	 fixed	 to	 a	
copy—that	is,	given	physical	permanence	and	perceptibility20—by	the	
hand21	of	the	author	at	some	point	during	the	creative	process.	An	au-
thor	who	 thinks	 about	 sufficiently	original	 expression	but	does	not	
write,	type,	or	speak	that	expression	into	the	world	cannot	seek	a	cop-
yright	for	her	“unexpressed	expression”	because	such	“unexpressed	
expressions”	 are	 merely	 thoughts.22	 Indeed,	 “unexpressed	 expres-
sions”	become	copyrightable	expressions	when	the	author	fixes	them	





the	 movements	 required	 to	 write	 or	 speak25	 (i.e.,	 fix)	 the	 creative	
thoughts	to	a	tangible	medium.	Authors	have	never	been	able	to	fix	
their	expressions	by	thought	alone.	“The	writings	which	are	to	be	pro-








some	tangible	 form.”);	 infra	Part	 I.B.3	(describing	the	“embodiment”	and	“duration”	
requirements	of	fixation).	







ing,	 CALTECH	 LETTERS	 (Mar.	 12,	 2019),	 https://caltechletters.org/science/what-is	
-creativity	[https://perma.cc/Z3CU-GGFG]	(detailing	the	neurological	mechanisms	be-
hind	the	origination	of	creative	thought).	
	 25.	 See	CHARLES	WATSON,	MATTHEW	KIRKCALDIE	&	GEORGE	PAXINOS,	THE	BRAIN	 58	
(2010).	








to	 challenge	 the	 implicit	 assumption	 that	 copyrightable	 expression	
must	be	fixed	at	the	direction	of	the	motor	cortex.28	BCIs	will	effec-
tively	abridge	the	traditional,	biological	process	of	expression	by	di-











the	 Constitution,34	 of	 course,	 do	 not	 explicitly	 address	 granting	
 










emergent	works	created	by	 intelligent	algorithms	with	 little	or	no	human	 interven-
tion.”).	












	 34.	 The	Constitution	states	 that	 “[t]he	Congress	 shall	have	 [the]	Power	 .	.	.	 [t]o	
promote	the	Progress	of	Science	and	useful	Arts,	by	securing	for	limited	Times	to	Au-
















technologies	 in	 the	 context	 of	 copyright	 protection	 to	 predict	 how	
Congress	and	the	courts	will	address	the	implications	of	BCI	technol-
ogy	for	U.S.	copyright	doctrine.	Moreover,	because	BCI	technology	fun-
damentally	 alters	 the	 traditional	 process	 of	 expression,	 this	 Note	







polishes	 them	 to	 remove	 the	 spontaneous	 thoughts	 and	 neuronal	
noise36	that	a	BCI	device	would	capture	alongside	otherwise	discern-
able	and	copyrightable	expression.	The	Author	will	argue	that	this	ef-




























to	 determine	whether	BCI-encoded	brain	 signals	 fall	 under	 any	 ac-













ployment	 of	modern	 BCI	 technology.	 Section	 B	 examines	 the	 basic	








practicality	 of	 utilizing	 the	 brain	 signals	 in	 a	 man-computer	 dia-
logue,”40	 Professor	 Jacques	 Vidal	 suggested	 that	 a	 computer	 could	























nonetheless	 prophesied	 in	 his	 study	 that	 “such	 a	 feat	 is	 potentially	
around	the	corner.”46	
Although	“the	dream	of	being	able	to	control	one’s	environment	
through	 thoughts”47	 existed	 only	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 science	 fiction	 in	
1973,	technological	advancements	have	permitted	BCIs	to	round	Vi-
dal’s	 proverbial	 corner.	 Vidal’s	 dream	 of	 BCI	 becoming	 a	 “genuine	
prosthetic	extension	of	the	brain”	has,	or	has	nearly,	manifested.	Re-
searchers	and	practitioners	have	primarily	used	BCIs,	 currently	de-



















	 49.	 Hyun	J.	Baek,	Min	Hye	Chang,	 Jeong	Heo	&	Kwang	Suk	Park,	Enhancing	the	
Usability	of	Brain-Computer	Interface	Systems,	COMPUTATIONAL	INTEL.	&	NEUROSCIENCE,	
June	2019,	at	1,	2	(describing	the	various	impairments	that	can	be	aided	with	the	use	






















































ative	 or	 authorial]	 intent.”58	 Feature	 translation	 is	 the	 process	 by	











could	 foreseeably	 measure	 the	 brain	 signals	 representing	 creative	
thought	itself	rather	than	the	signals	generated	to	physically	express	




code	 th[ose]	 representation[s],	word	 by	word,	 into	 .	.	.	 English	 sen-





























































compiler	 .	.	.	 transfers	 compiled	 [binary	 code]	 to	 corresponding	 high-level	 source	
code.”);	Daniel	Lin,	Matthew	Sag	&	Ronald	S.	Laurie,	Source	Code	Versus	Object	Code:	




See	 generally	 Source	 Code:	What	 Exactly	 Is	 It?,	 IONOS	 (July	 2,	 2020),	 https://www	
.ionos.com/digitalguide/websites/web-development/source-code-explained-defini-
tion-examples/	[https://perma.cc/4D3C-YW6Z]	(explaining	the	use	of	advanced	text	









in	which	 it	 is	described,	explained,	 illustrated,	or	embodied	 in	such	
work.”70	 Sections	102(a)–(b)	 supply	 four	basic	 requirements	 that	 a	
work	must	satisfy	to	qualify	for	copyright	protection:	(1)	“work	of	au-













































used	 throughout	 its	 provisions,	 “originality”	 is	 noticeably	 absent.80	
The	 courts	 have	 determined	 that	 “originality”	 requires	 only	 “inde-
pendent	 creation81	 plus	 a	 modicum	 of	 creativity.”82	 The	 Supreme	




















































der,	 may	 yield	 sufficiently	 distinguishable	 variations”	 to	 qualify	 a	
work	as	original.88	
A	provision	of	works	that	the	courts	have	determined	qualify	for	
copyright	 protection	 will	 better	 illuminate	 the	 originality	 require-















































either	directly	or	with	 the	aid	of	 a	machine.”96	 Further,	 “[t]he	 term	




an	 “embodiment	 requirement”	 and	 a	 “duration	 requirement.”99	 A	
work	satisfies	 the	embodiment	requirement	 if	 it	 is	 “placed	 in	a	me-
dium	such	 that	 it	 can	be	perceived,	 reproduced,	 etc.,	 from	 that	me-
dium.”100	For	example,	the	audiovisual	effects	video	games	generate	


































pression	 dichotomy.”106	 The	 idea/expression	 dichotomy	 first	 ap-
peared	in	the	seminal	case	Baker	v.	Selden.107		
In	Baker,	“the	plaintiff	Selden	wrote	and	obtained	copyrights	on	
a	 series	of	books	 setting	out	 a	new	system	of	bookkeeping.”108	The	
books	described	the	plaintiff’s	bookkeeping	system	and	included	var-
ious	 forms	“with	ruled	 lines	and	headings”	 for	use	 in	his	system.109	
Defendant	Baker	published	account	books	that	utilized	forms	similar	
to	 those	 included	 in	 the	 plaintiff’s	 books,	 and	 the	 plaintiff	 subse-


































































































text	of	 a	work;	 such	 text	 represents	 the	author’s	 expression.	 In	be-
tween	these	two	layers	are	paraphrases	and	summaries	of	the	work.	
The	courts	and	factfinders	are	charged	with	determining	which	layer	
separates	 expression	 from	 idea	 and	 granting	 copyright	 protection	
only	to	those	works	(or	elements	of	works)	constituting	expression.126	








1967)	(“When	the	uncopyrightable	subject	matter	 is	very	narrow,	so	 that	 ‘the	 topic	
necessarily	requires,’	if	not	only	one	form	of	expression,	at	best	only	a	limited	number,	















utilitarianism	and	 (2)	moral	 right.	Although	 the	 former	 theory	pre-
dominates	American	justifications	for	copyright	protection,127	the	U.S.	
Copyright	 Office	 has	 recognized	 that	 elements	 of	 the	 latter	 theory,	









Clause”)	of	 the	Constitution	authorizes	Congress	 to	enact	 copyright	
legislation	“[t]o	promote	the	Progress	of	Science	and	useful	Arts,	by	














	 129.	 See	 U.S.	 COPYRIGHT	 OFF.,	 AUTHORS,	 ATTRIBUTION,	 AND	 INTEGRITY:	 EXAMINING	
MORAL	RIGHTS	IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	5	(2019)	(“The	Copyright	Office	believes	that	the	











American	 Revolution	 by	 sixty-seven	 years—“vest[ed]	 the	 Copies	 of	



















The	 judiciary	 is,	 of	 course,	 acutely	 aware	 of	 the	 Constitution’s	
utilitarian	basis	for	copyright	protection,	and	it	frequently	invokes	the	











Possibilities:	 The	 Life	 of	 a	 Legal	 Transplant,	 25	 BERKELEY	 TECH.	 L.J.	 1427,	 1429–30	




















Utilitarianism,	 however,	 is	 not	 the	 universal	 basis	 for	 granting	
copyright	protection.	The	predominant	 justification	for	copyright	 in	
Europe,	for	example,	is	founded	on	a	philosophy	of	natural	rights,143	










































produce	 the	results	of	 those	processes	was	alienable	and	subject	 to	
economic	transaction.153		
Although	“[t]he	fundamental	overriding	purpose	of	United	States	
copyright	 law	 is	 social	 utility[,]”154	 Congress	 has	 passed	 legislation	
that	bears	the	mark	of	moral	right	justification.155	The	Visual	Artists	
Rights	Act	of	1990	(VARA)	protects	an	artist’s	“rights	of	attribution”	














































Constitution	 and	 the	 Copyright	 Act	 of	 1976.162	 But	 like	 the	 photo-





ated,	have	all	been	discovered	 long	since	 the	statute	 [and	Constitu-
tion]	w[ere]	enacted.”165	The	fact	that	BCI	will—for	the	first	time	in	






























doctrine,168	 “courts	and	commentators	 .	.	.	 [have]	never	define[d]	or	









tionaries	 therefore	 have	 become	 authoritative	 sources	 on	 the	 com-
mon	construction	of	words.170	Because	the	Constitution	and	the	Cop-







those	 digitized,	machine-readable	 signals	 on	 an	 external	 digital	 de-
vice174	 (i.e.,	a	medium175),	BCI-encoded	brain	signals	constitute	“ex-
pression”	according	to	Merriam-Webster’s	definition.	
Black’s	 Law	 Dictionary	 alternatively	 defines	 “expression”	 as	



















emotions,	 or	 opinions.”176	 BCI-encoded	 brain	 signals	 are	 neither	
“speech”	 nor	 “actions.”	 They	 do,	 however,	 represent	 creative	
“thoughts.”	 Whether	 BCI-encoded	 brain	 signals	 constitute	 “expres-







Whether	 BCI-encoded	 brain	 signals	 qualify	 as	 “writings”—and	













define—“expression”	 in	 the	 copyright	 context,	 it	 undoubtedly	 pro-
vides	the	basis	for	protection	of	“expression”	rather	than	“ideas.”	Ac-























Because	 U.S.	 copyright	 law	 is	 constitutionally	 related	 to	 First	
Amendment	protections,	one	may	apply	a	First	Amendment	definition	





















pression”	 under	 this	 First	 Amendment	 definition	 of	 the	 term.	
Although	the	BCI-encoded	brain	signals	would	manifest	in	a	digitized,	
machine-readable	 form,186	 they	 are	 “expression”	 under	 a	 First	
 
	 181.	 U.S.	CONST.	amend.	I.	
	 182.	 See,	e.g.,	N.Y.	Times	Co.	v.	 Sullivan,	376	U.S.	254,	269	 (1964)	 (“The	general	
proposition	that	freedom	of	expression	.	.	.	is	secured	by	the	First	Amendment	has	long	
been	settled	by	our	decisions.”).	
	 183.	 Margaret	L.	Mettler,	Graffiti	Museum:	A	First	Amendment	Argument	 for	Pro-
tecting	 Uncommissioned	 Art	 on	 Private	 Property,	 111	MICH.	L.	REV.	249,	262	 (2012)	
(quoting	Texas	v.	Johnson,	491	U.S.	397,	404	(1989)).	












Amendment	 construction	 so	 long	 as	 they	 communicate	 some	mes-
sage.187		
Although	 the	 Constitution	 does	 not	 define	 “expression”	 in	 the	
copyright	context,	judicial	interpretation	of	the	Intellectual	Property	
Clause’s	 reference	 to	 “writings”	 explicitly	 incorporates	 “expres-
sion.”188	The	oft-quoted	Burrow-Giles	definition	of	“writings”189	indi-
cates	 that	 any	 “visible	 embodiment	of	 an	 idea”	 constitutes	 “expres-
sion.”190	 The	 decision	 in	 Stowe	 v.	 Thomas,	 which	 contrasts	












BCI-encoded	 brain	 signals	 easily	 fit	within	 this	 constitutionally	 de-






tirely	 novel	 avenue	 through	which	 thoughts	manifest	 in	 a	 physical	

































the	 authorized	 and	 unauthorized	 copies,	 readers	 would	 purchase	 the	
cheaper	of	the	two,	which,	in	turn,	would	lower	prices	across	the	board,	thus	






















to	 the	person”	 than	their	 thoughts,	and	a	Hegelian	system	would	also	 likely	protect	





























itarian	 calculus	 that	 supports	 a	 grant	 of	 copyrightability	 for	 suffi-
ciently	original	works	of	authorship	appears	not	to	support	a	grant	of	














































codes	 brain	 signals	 representing	 distinct	 creative	 thoughts,	 each	
distinct	creative	 thought	 is	potentially	copyrightable.212	 If	ownership	
and	use	of	BCIs	were	to	become	ubiquitous—like	the	ownership	and	
 
	 206.	 See,	e.g.,	 Judith	N.	Mildner	&	Diana	I.	Tamir,	Spontaneous	Thought	as	an	Un-
constrained	Memory	Process,	42	TRENDS	NEUROSCIENCE	763,	763	(2019)	(“In	our	minds,	
thoughts	unfold	continuously	and	freely.”).	
























potentially	 copyrightable	 works	 of	 authorship—undoubtedly	 fol-
lowed	the	arrival	of	social	media.214	Surely,	then,	the	emergence	of	a	













sive	 and	 lengthy	 proceedings218—for	 an	 immeasurable	 body	 of	
 
	 213.	 See	Mobile	Fact	Sheet,	PEW	RSCH.	CTR.	(June	12,	2019),	https://www.pewre-












































tinct	 thought	 (or	 stream	of	 consciousness)	would	be	 copyrightable,	
courts—and	 even	 authors—might	 struggle	 to	 determine	which	 en-
coded	signals	form	the	copyrightable	expression.	
These	 determinability	 issues	 would	 arise	 from	 (1)	 neuronal	
noise222	and	(2)	spontaneous	thought.	Neuronal	noise,	in	a	BCI	con-
text,	might	render	imprecise	the	digital	output	of	encoded	brain	sig-
nals.	 For	 example,	where	 a	BCI	 captures	 and	 encodes	brain	 signals	
representing	the	phrase	“I	like	dogs,”	the	neuronal	noise	within	those	
signals	might	“contaminate”	the	phrase	such	that	the	phrase	no	longer	




ations	 and	 disturbances—often	 infiltrates	 and	 interrupts	 an	 other-
wise	 concerted	 stream	of	 consciousness.224	 Spontaneous	 thought	 is	
 
	 219.	 U.S.	 COPYRIGHT	OFF.,	 ANNUAL	REPORT	 FOR	 FISCAL	 2018,	 at	 6	 (2018)	 https://	
www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2018/ar2018.pdf	[https://perma.cc/5KBT	
-JK6F].	













concepts	 such	 as	 mind	 wandering,	 daydreaming,	 creativity,	 and	
dreaming.”225	One	study	reported	that	mind	wandering—i.e.,	“stimu-








codes	 brain	 signals	 representing	 the	 phrase	 “I	 like	 dogs,”	 that	 BCI	
would	 also	 capture	 the	 signals	 representing	 spontaneous	 thought	
such	 that	 the	 BCI’s	 output	 might	 read	 “I	 like	 [what’s	 for	 dinner?]	
dogs.”230	Neuronal	noise	and	spontaneous	thought	therefore	pose	a	
practical	 problem	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 copyrightable	 elements	
within	BCI-encoded	brain	signals.	
Although	BCI-encoded	brain	signals	qualify	as	copyrightable	“ex-
pression”	under	 lay	and	constitutional	 constructions	of	 the	word,	 a	
grant	of	copyright	protection	to	works	composed	of	such	signals	does	









	 229.	 Wendy	Hasenkamp,	 Christine	D.	Wilson-Mendenhall,	 Erica	Duncan	&	Law-
rence	W.	Barsalou,	Mind	Wandering	and	Attention	During	Focused	Meditation:	A	Fine-
Grained	 Temporal	 Analysis	 of	 Fluctuating	 Cognitive	 States,	 59	NEUROIMAGE	750,	750	
(2012).	
	 230.	 The	bracketed	 language	here	represents	a	spontaneous	thought	 interfering	

























under	 contemporary	 copyright	 law.	Congress,	however,	 could	 insti-
tute	an	exceptional	effort	requirement	 that	would	raise	 the	“cost	of	
















The	 cost	 of	 expression	 of	 creating	 BCI-encoded	 brain	 signals,	
however,	 consists	only	of	 intellectual	 labor,	 and	 that	 intellectual	 la-
bor—i.e.,	 thinking—occurs	ceaselessly.238	The	cost	of	expression	an	


































































rightable	 works	 of	 authorship	 would	 come	 to	 a	 halt.	 Although	 the	
production	of	raw	BCI-encoded	brain	signals	would	remain	incessant,	
the	 production	 of	 polished,	 statutorily	 copyrightable	 brain	 signals	
would	be	far	more	limited.	Indeed,	not	everyone	who	thinks	is	com-
pelled	 to	 invest	 time	 or	 effort	 into	 transforming	 their	 expressive	
thoughts	into	a	copyrightable—i.e.,	registrable	and	actionable—form.	
Although	the	emergence	of	a	new	form	of	copyrightable	expression	
might	 result	 in	 an	 uptick	 in	 copyright	 registrations	 and	 related	 ac-






posed	 supra,	 an	 author	 who	 wishes	 to	 copyright	 her	 BCI-encoded	
brain	signals	must	invest	the	time	and	effort	to	remove	neuronal	noise	
and	spontaneous	 thoughts	and	 to	 indicate	where	her	 copyrightable	
expression	begins	and	ends.249	The	effort	requirement	therefore	im-
plicitly	remedies	the	determinability	issues	this	Note	illustrates.	






























right	a	book	upon	which	one	has	expended	 labor	 in	 its	preparation	
does	 not	 depend	 upon	 whether	 the	 materials	 which	 he	 has	 col-
lected	.	.	.	show	literary	skill	or	originality,	either	in	thought	or	in	lan-
guage,	or	anything	more	than	industrious	collection.”255	It	further	de-








































tection.	 Rather,	 a	 work	 composed	 of	 uncopyrightable	 material	 be-
comes	copyrightable	only	after	the	author	“select[s],	coordinate[s],	or	
arrange[s]”262—i.e.,	 edits—the	 material.	 And	 because	 the	 “writings	
which	are	 to	be	protected	are	 the	 fruits	of	 intellectual	 labor,”263	 the	
Feist	Court’s	recognition	that	an	author’s	selection,	coordination,	and	







context.	 Rather,	 because	 the	 effort	 requirement	would	 obligate	 au-






































“raw”	materials	 copyrightable.	 BCI-encoded	 brain	 signals—like	 the	
conversational	material	at	 issue	in	Estate	of	Hemingway—represent	



































render	 their	 encoded	 brain	 signals	 copyrightable	 in	 our	 utilitarian	
copyright	system.		




founded	 and	 its	 protections	 afforded.	 Progress	 and	 innovation	will	
force	 lawmakers	and	 judges	to	evaluate	 the	 legality	of	a	 technology	
not	by	the	letter	of	the	law,	but	rather	by	its	spirit.	This	Note	is	demon-
strative	of	 that	assertion:	although	our	operative	 law	 indicates	 that	
BCI-encoded	 thoughts	 are	 copyrightable,	 the	 Constitution	 indicates	
otherwise,	for	its	concern	with	the	form	that	copyrightable	expression	
assumes	 is	 outweighed	 by	 its	 interest	 in	 promoting	 productive	 en-
gagement	with	the	arts	and	sciences.	So	too	will	other	emergent	tech-
nologies	necessitate	a	return	to	nuanced	scrutiny	of	our	Constitution	
and	its	underlying	theory.	
	
